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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
GEORGE K. THOMPSON and FRANK S. 
MARKHAM, co-partnership doing busi-
ness under the firm name and style of 
THOMPSON-MARKHAM COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, WILLIAM M. KNERR, Chairman 
and member of said The Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, and 0. F. McSHANE and 
FRANK A. JUGLER, members of said 
The Industrial Commission of Utah, and 
E. A. HODGES, State Metal Mine In-
spector, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 6221 
Plaintiffs, under a contract with the United States of 
America, Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 
are engaged in the construction of a certain tunnel known 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
as the Alpine-Draper Tunnel, Salt Lake Aqueduct, which 
forms a part of the project known as the Deer Creek Proj-
ect, having for its purpose the conveyance and transporta-
tion of water from the Deer. Creek Reservoir in Provo River, 
Utah County, for use by subscribers of water in Salt Lake 
County. Said tunnel, when completed, will run from a 
point in the vicinity of Alpine, Utah County, Utah, to a 
point in the vicinity of Draper, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Said tunnel projects through the elevation separating said 
points, and when completed, will have an approximate length 
of 15,000 feet, and will be approximately seven (7) feet in· 
diameter. Said tunnel will be a straight bore, and will be 
lined and re-enforced with concrete and steel. 
The tunnel is being driven for the purpose of convey-
ing water, only; and not for the purpose of exploring for, 
or discovering mineral values, or to develop or operate a 
mine, and is not connected at all with any mining venture. 
In the prosecution of said work, plaintiffs require their 
employees to work eight hours per day at their place of 
employment within the tunnel, and to change shifts at the 
place of employment within said tunnel, and not at the 
portal of said tunnel. The time consumed by the workmen 
in going from the portal to the place of employment, and 
returning therefrom to the portal, is not computed as a 
part of said eight hour period. 
Defendants claim jurisdiction under the eight hour law, 
Section 49-3-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended 
by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, to require plaintiffs to 
work their employees not more than eight hours per day,. 
said eight hours to be computed from the time said em-
ployees enter the portal of the tunnel, until they return to 
said portal, and claim jurisdiction to enforce said eight hour 
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law as interpreted by said defendants, and threaten to in-
stitute numerous prosecutions against plaintiffs unless they 
cease to work said employees not to exceed eight hours, 
from the time they enter the portal until they return to the 
portal of said tunnel. For the Court's convenience we set 
out plaintiffs' petition as "Exhibit 1" and defendants' an-
swer as "Exhibit 2." · 
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION INVOLVED 
The question involved is, have plaintiffs the right to 
permit and require their employees to work eight hours per 
day at their place of employment within said tunnel, ex-
clusive of the time required in going from the portal of said 
tunnel to the place of employment, and returning from the 
place of employment to the portal of said tunnel. 
ARGUMENT 
THE ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF PROIDBITION SHOULD 
BE MADE PERMANENT BECAUSE, 
1. Section 49-3-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as 
amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, has no appli-
cation to a tunnel such as the one being driven by plain-
tiffs. Said act applies only to underground mines or under-
ground workings connected with mining. 
2. Said Section is a penal statute, and must be strictly 
construed, and will be interpreted as being limited only to 
such classes of employment as come clearly within the terms 
of the act. 
3. If Section 49-3-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
as amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, applies to 
a tunnel such as plaintiffs are driving, the act violates Sec-
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tions 1, 3, 7, and 24 of Article one of the constitution of 
Utah, and the 14th Amendment of the constitution of the 
United States. 
I. 
THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT HAS NO APPLICA-
TION TO A TUNNEL SUCH AS THE ONE BEING 
DRIVEN BY PLAINTIFFS. 
The act which plaintiffs are charged with violating, 
Section 49-3-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended 
by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, reads as follows: 
"49-3-2. A DAY'S WORK-MINES AND SMELT-
ERS. The period of employment of working men in 
smelters and all other institutions for the reduction or 
refining of ores or metals; shall be eight hours per day, 
and the period of employment of working men in all 
underground mines or workings shall be not more than 
eight hours per day, such eight hour period shall be 
computed from the time men go underground until 
they return to the surface, except in cases of emergency 
where life or property is in imminent danger; provided, 
however, when underground hoists or pumps are in con-
tinuous operation, hoistmen and pumpmen employed 
on such hoists or pumps may be permitted to be under-
ground not to exceed eight hours and thirty minutes. 
Any employer who violates any of the provisions of 
this section is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
The Constitution, Article 16, deals with the general 
subject of labor. 
Section six (6) of that Article is as follows: 
"Sec. 6. (EIGHT HOURS A DAY'S LABOR ON 
PUBLIC WORKS.) Eight hours shall constitute a 
day's work on all works or undertakings carried on or 
aided by the State, County or Municipal governments; 
and the Legislature shall pass laws to provide for the 
health and safety of employees in factoi·ies, smelbm; 
and mines." 
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The framers of the Constitution gave a mandate to the 
Legislature to provide for the health and safety of em-
ployees in factories, smelters and mines. 
That mandate is specific; there was no general mandate 
to the Legislature to pass laws to provide for the health 
and safety of employees in all underground workings. Un-
derground workings, not connected with mining, were not 
included in the mandate of the Constitution, any more than 
was farming or cattle raising. 
The first legislature of Utah, in 1896, (Chapter 72, 
Laws of Utah, 1896, at Page 219) enacted a law entitled, 
"An act regulating the hours of employment in underground 
mines, and in smelting and ore reduction works," as follows: 
"Section 1. The period of employment of working 
men in all underground mines or workings shall be 
eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency where 
life or property is in imminent danger. 
"Section 2. The period of employment of work-
ing men in smelters and all other institutions for the 
reduction or refining of ores or metals shall be eight 
(8) hours per day, except in cases of emergency where 
life or property is in imminent danger. 
"Section 3. Any person, body corporate, agent, 
manager or employer, who shall violate any of the pro-
visons of Sections 1 and 2 of this act, shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, interpreted 
the above mentioned act in the cases of State of Utah v. 
Holden 14 Utah, 71, 46 Pac. 756 and State v. Holden 14 
. . 
Utah, 96, 46 Pac. 1105. 
The first mentioned case was Habeas Corpus. Plain-
tiff was charged with employing a workman in underground 
mining more than eight hours per day, in violation of Sec-
tion 1 of the act. 
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The second case was appeal. Defendant was charged 
with employing a workman in his concentrating mill, for 
the reduction of ores, more than eight hours per day, in 
violation of Section 2 of the act. 
In the first mentioned case, the Court said, at Page 
95 of the 14th Utah Reports: 
"The section of the statute whose constitutionality 
is involved in this case includes all employees and em-
ployers engaged in working underground mines. None 
are omitted who may be subject to the peculiar condi-
tions that attend such mining. The provision of the 
state constitution quoted makes it the duty of the legis-
lature to 'pass laws to provide for the health and safety 
of employees in factories, smelters and mines.' And we 
are not authorized to hold that the law in question is 
not calculated and adapted in any degree to promote 
the health and safety of persons working in mines and 
smelters. Were we to do so, and declare it void, we 
would usurp the powers intrusted by the constitution 
to the lawmaking power." 
In the second mentioned case, the Court said, at Page 
98 and 99 of the 14th Utah Reports: 
"The people of the state, in their constitution, made 
it mandatory upon the legislature to 'pass laws to pro-
vide for the health and the safety of the employees in 
factories, smelters and mines .... ' The law in question 
is confined to the protection of that class of people 
engaged in labor in underground mines, and in smelters 
and other works wherein ores are reduced and refined. 
This law applies only to the classes subjected by their 
employment to the peculiar conditions and effects at-
tending underground mining and work in smelters, and 
other works for the reduction and refining of ores. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to discuss or decide 
whether the legislature can fix the hours of labor in 
other employments." 
We submit that the 1896 statute was enacted in pur-
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suance of the constitutional provision, Article 16, Section 6; 
and had for its purpose, and its sole purpose, the fulfillment 
of that mandate. That it was intended only to apply to 
the industries named in the constitution, to-wit, factories, 
smelters and mines. The Supreme Court of this state, so 
interpreted the act. At Page 83 of 14th Utah Report, in 
commenting on the constitutional provision, the Court said: 
"The second clause of the Section commands the 
legislature to pass laws 'for the health and safety of 
employees in factories, smelters and mines.' This pro-
vision must be regarded as an expression of the will of 
the people of the state with respect to the subjects and 
objects of legislation named in it; .... Any law adapted 
to the preservation of the health or safety of employees 
in factories, smelters, or mines is within the scope of 
this provision. The law must be connected with some 
of the objects named, and calculated to effect that pur-
pose. If it is not so connected and adapted, the court 
has the right to hold that it is not within the scope of 
the provision." 
Appeals were taken from the decisions in the Holden 
cases heretofore mentioned to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and that court, in the case of Holden v. 
Hardy, 169 U. S. 366; 42 L. Ed. 780; 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 
quoted approvingly from the decisions of the Utah Court, 
and at Page 389 (18 Sup. Ct. Rep.) used the following lan-
guage: 
"The enactment does not profess to limit the hours 
of all workmen, but merely those who are employed 
in underground mines, or in smelting, reduction or re-
fining of ores or metals." 
The first legislative enactment of the eight hour law 
(Laws 1896) was interpreted by the Supreme Court of this 
state in October 1896, as applying only to underground 
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mines, and the Supreme Court of the United States inter-
preted the law in conformity with the decision of this court. 
The legislative department of the State of Utah must 
be presumed to be familiar with the interpretation placed 
upon the language "underground mines or workings" by 
this court. 
In Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, under Title 36, 
(LABOR), Chapter 2 (EIGHT HOUR LAW) Section 1337 
entitled "In Mines and Smelters," reads in part as follows: 
"The period of employment of working men in all 
underground mines or workings, and in smelters .... , 
shall be eight hours per day .... " 
In Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, the subject under 
consideration is found in Title 43 (LABOR), Chapter 2 
(EIGHT HOUR LAW), Section 1337, which reads in part 
as follows: 
"(1337.) IN MINES AND SMELTERS. The pe-
riod of employment of working men in all underground 
mines or workings, and in smelters .... , shall be eight 
hours per day .... " 
This subject is found in Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, 
under Title 58 (LABOR), Chapter 3 (EIGHT HOUR LAW), 
Section 3667, which reads in part as follows: 
"3667. ( 1337.) IN MINES AND SMELTERS. 
The period of employment of working men in all under-
ground mines or workings, and in smelters .... , shall 
be eight hours per day .... " 
This subject is again found in Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, under Title 49 (LABOR), Chapter 3 (EIGHT HOUR 
LAW), Section 49-3-2, which reads in part as follows: 
"49-3-2 Id. IN MINES AND SMELTERS. The 
period of employment of working men in all under-
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ground mines or workings, and in smelters .... , shall 
be eight hours per day .... " 
It will be observed, that the Title of Chapter 59, Laws 
of Utah, 1937, is "Eight Hour Law," and the caption of the 
amended Section is "A DAY'S WORK-MINES AND 
SMELTERS." 
It is significant that in every statute regulating hours 
of labor, from the enactment in 1896 to that in 1937, that 
the words "underground mines or workings" appear identi-
cal in each enactment. 
No clarifying amendment has been made by the legis-
lature to extend the meaning of the term. Nor has there 
been one change in the language used, indicating that the 
legislature intended it to apply to any underground work-
ings_ not connected with mining. 
There is a strong presumption, that the legislative de-
partment must have concurred in the interpretation placed 
upon the statute by the judicial department, otherwise, over 
the intervening period of 43 years, that department would 
have made clear its intention to apply the eight hour law 
to underground workings not connected with mining. 
It would have been simple indeed, had the legislature 
desired to enlarge the scope of the law as enacted in 1896 
to have used appropriate language for that purpose. 
Had the legislature intended to make the law appli-
cable to other undergro~nd workings it would not have re-
peated the identical language which the court had thereto-
fore interpreted as applicable only to mines. 
The meaning and application of the statute in question 
must be considered in light of the judicial construction 
placed upon the words "underground mines or workings." 
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This rule of construction is stated in 59 C. J. Sec. 613 in 
the following language: 
"When a statute has been construed by the highest 
court having jurisdiction to pass on it, such construc-
tion is as much a part of the statute as if plainly writ-
ten into it orginally .... ;and when words have a well-
settled meaning, through judicial construction they 
must be understood, when used in a statute, to have 
that meaning, unless a different meaning is unmistak-
ably indicated .... " 
In a footnote to the above quotation in 59 C. J., the 
case of Plaster & M. F. G. Company v. Juab County, 33 
Utah 114, 93 Pac. 53 is cited. This court, at Page 119 of 
the Utah Report said: 
" .... In view that the decisions of courts are but 
the reflection of the common understanding with re-
spect to particular things and the terms used in any 
indpstry, business or calling, and are thus simply re-
duced to legal terms, we think that if the courts have 
construed and applied what is meant by the terms 
'mine' and 'mines,' then this meaning must control, and 
especially so when the term is used in some statute or 
constitution. This must be so for the simple reason 
that the term will then have acquired a legal meaning, 
which, unless the contrary clearly appears from the 
context, must be deen1ed to be the meaning intended 
to be applied to it in the law in which it is found." 
The term "underground mines or workings" was de-
clared by this court in the Holden cases to apply only to 
underground mines. The re-enactment by the legislature 
with the identical words as interpreted by the court must 
be construed to apply only to mines. 
The 1896 law was re-enacted in Revised Statutes 1898, 
as Section 1337. And this court in the case of Short v. 
Mining Co. 20 Utah, 20, after quoting Section 6 of Article 
16 of the Constitution of Utah said, at Pages 26 and 27: 
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"The act in question was enacted as a police regu-
lation, and for the public good in the intere~t of public 
policy. The experience in the past few years in the 
business of mining and smelting and underground work-
ings of mines shows that such business can no longer 
be carried on with due regard to the safety and health 
of those miners engaged in such business without spe-
cial protection and restraint against the danger neces-
sarily incident to such employment .... The employ-
ment of operatives when too long pursued, in smelters 
and undergrotmd mines is considered by the legislature 
as detrimental to the health of the employees .... It 
was therefore considered that the employment of men 
in smelters and underground mines, for a period of more 
than eight hours per day, was detrimental to the health 
of such persons." 
Again, in the Short case, this court construed the lan-
guage "underground mines or workings" as applying only 
to underground mines. And again and again since that 
decision the legislature continued to use the same language 
in re-enacting the eight hour law. 
If the statute in question is ambiguous reference to 
the title, chapter and section headings of every revision 
since the act of 1896, will disclose that the legislature was 
regulating the hours of Labor in Mines and Smelters. 
In Vol. 25 R. C. L. Sec. 267 at Page 1031 the author 
says: 
"It is, however, now the generally accepted view 
both in England and in this country that the title of 
an act is so far a part of the same that it may be re-
sorted to where the meaning of the act is ambiguous, 
for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning. As 
said by Chief Justice Marshall in an early case: 'Where 
the mind labors to discover the design of the legisla-
ture, it seizes everything from which aid can be de-
rived; and in such case the title claims a degree of 
notice and will have its due share of consideration.'" 
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The word "workings" used in the act appears to have 
been given no technical meaning by the legislature, and its 
association with the other words of the act "underground 
mines or workings," considered with the title of the section, 
clearly indicates that such word has reference only to mines. 
In Words and Phrases, 1st series, Vol. 8, Page 7522 
appears the following: 
"The term 'workings,' as used in the act relating 
to mines and mining, includes all the excavated parts 
of a mine, those abandoned as well as the places actu-
ally worked." P. & L. Dig. Laws Pa. 1894, Vol. 2, Col. 
3110. 
Technical words relating to an art, science or trade 
when used in a statute dealing with the subject matter of 
such art, science or trade, are ordinarily to be taken in 
their technical sense, and will be so construed, unless the 
context or other considerations show a contrary intent. 
Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 
Sec. 393. 
When general words follow particular words, the latter 
are given the meaning of the former. 
Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. 
Sec. 424. 
The application of the statute in question, to every case 
in which work is, or may be carried on under ground would 
reduce the act to an absurdity. Every sewer constructed 
by a sewer district would technically place workmen under 
ground. Even a man engaged in digging a well would be 
engaged in an underground working used in the broad non-
technical sense, and if employed for that purpose, would 
be subject to this law. Excavations for basements and ex-
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cavations in connection with the construction of dams, under 
an interpretation of the act as contended for by defendants, 
may well be termed underground workings. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada interpreted the Nevada 
eight hour law which provided: 
"The period of employment of working men in all 
underground mines or workings shall be eight hours 
per day." 
In the case of Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac 1, 
after expressly approving the Holden cases and quoting at 
length from them, the court used this language: 
" .... The language forbids any person from work-
ing in underground mines, smelters or mills for the 
reduction of ores more than eight hours per day .... 
We may consider the protection of the health and lives 
of that large portion of the people in this state who 
delve in the earth in search of the precious metals that 
help enrich the commerce of the world, and who there 
and in the smelters and ore reduction works come in 
contact with poisonous minerals, and breathe dust, foul 
air, and obnoxious fumes and gases. In this connection 
it should be remembered that the statute applies to 
underground mines, and not to placer claims, or to men 
working in the open above the surface." 
II. 
CHAPTER 59, LAWS OF UTAH, 1937, IS A PENAL 
STATUTE AND MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED. 
The Utah eight hour law being penal, will be inter-
preted as applying only to such classes of employment as 
come clearly within the terms of the act. 
Strictly construed, the act in question applies only to 
underground workings connected with mines. In the case 
of Ex parte Twing, Cal. 204 Pac. 1083, the court said: 
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"But penal statutes must be construed to reach no 
further than their words; no person can be· made sub-
ject to them by implication .... Haxfield v. United· 
States, 197 U. s. 442, 49 L. Ed. 826." 
A statute somewhat similar to the one in question was 
construed by the Missouri court in the case of State v. Cant-
well, 78 S. W. 569. That court said: 
"It is insisted that this Act makes a distinction 
between those working under ground in search of min-
erals and those working under ground. not in search 
of minerals. This Act applies only to the class search-
ing for minerals-after that class it makes no distinc-
tion. The Legislature doubtless realized the necessity· 
of the provisions of this Act being made applicable to 
those in search of minerals. The operations of mines 
is a permanent business, lasting frequently for many 
years. On the other hand the digging of a well or the 
running of a tunnel is not to be classed as a business, 
it is work that is completed in a comparatively short 
time. Hence, there was absolutely no reason or ne-
cessity for including in the Act those who might in the 
construction of railroads or other works incidentally 
be required to work beneath the surface of the· earth." 
By an Act of the Nevada Legislature of 1909; provision 
was made for the office of Inspector of Mines, authorizing 
investigations requiring certain regulatory measures with 
respect to the operations of mfues. 
In 1911 the Legislature added numeroul? provisions pro-
hibiting certain things with reference to the operation of 
mines. Section 22 of that act reads: 
"Use of gasoline under ground is prohibited~" 
In 1931 the Legislature again amended the act and at-
tempted to provide that all of its provisions should, "be ex-
tended to and imposed upon the owner, constructor, con-
tractor~ subcontractor * * * and/or employee as the· case 
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may be of all such tunnels, drifts, and other underground 
excavations and workings where persons are employed at 
work in this State." 
In the construction of Boulder Dam, the contractor 
used gasoline propelled trucks in underground excavations 
in carrying out his contract with the United States. The 
Mine Inspector sought to impose the provisions of the law 
above mentioned, particularly the prohibition against the 
use of gasoline under ground, to meet which the contractor 
brought injunction. 
In the trial of the case the defendant conceding for 
the sake of argument that the 1931 act was unconstitutional, 
contended that the original act of 1909 as amended by the 
acts of 1911 and 1913, prohibiting the use of gasoline under 
ground would be applicable to the work being carried on 
by the contractor for -the Boulder Dam, but the court re-
fused to adopt such contention, holding: 
"Even if we assume that the title of the original 
act creating the office of inspector of mines was suffi-
ciently broad to justify the incorporation therein of the 
amendments of 1911 and 1913 above referred to, and 
that such amendments, did not violate the Constitution 
of Nevada, it is clear that the intention of the Legis-
lature was to control mining operations, and that the 
provision that 'no gasoline should be used under ground' 
except onder prescribed conditions must be held to ap-
ply to such operations only. The fact that similar oper-
ations, such as tunnel work, might be subject to the 
same hazards as in the case of mines, does not justify 
the application of the section prohibiting the use of 
gasoline underground to something other than mines 
if it were the intention of the Legislature in the first 
place to apply the rule to mines only. If this matter, 
of the applicability of the prohibition as to gasoline 
underground to tunnels, is in doubt, under section 22 
as originally added by am.endment in 1911, the amend-
ment of 1913 (St. Nev. 1913, C. 224 (Comp. Laws Nev. 
1929 4229)) to section 22, which made an exception to 
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the general rule prohibiting gasoline underground in 
favor of small gas engines, in mines at no greater depths 
than 250 feet when appropriate provision was made to 
take care of the exhaust as required by the act, clearly 
shows that the intention was to confine the prohibition 
of the act to underground operation in mines. That is 
to say, the amended section 22 clearly applies to mines 
only. We would not be justified in extending the mean-
ing of the Legislature beyond its original intent as ex-
pressed in the act of 1909 as amended in 1911 and 1913, 
.... " "Six Companies Inc. v. Stinson," 2nd Fed. Supp. 
689. 
Wyoming has strictly construed its eight hour day for 
coal miners by holding that miners and laborers are not 
covered by the words "any owners, lessees, or operators, 
his or her agent, employees or servants." State v. Thomp-
son, 15 Wyo. 136; 87 Pac. 433. 
In Ex parte 1.\lartin (Cal.) 106 Pac. 235 the Cali-
fornia statute (St. 1909 P. 279 C. 18) read: 
"Section 1. That the period of employment for all 
persons who are employed or engaged in work in under-
ground mines in search of minerals, whether base or 
precious, or who are engaged in such underground 
mines for other purposes, or who are employed or en-
gaged in other underground worldngs whether for the 
purpose of tunneling, making excavations or to accom-
plish any other purpose of design, or who are employed 
in smelters and other institutions for the reduction or 
refining of ores or metals, shall not exceed eight hours 
within any twenty-four hours .... etc." 
The court commented on the case of Holden v. Hardy, 
supra, and at Page 238 said: 
"It may be questioned whether in view of the title 
of the act, the limitation of hours applies to all under-
ground work, or only to that performed in mines." 
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In E.~ parte Martin (Cal.) 106 Pac. 238, a case in-
volving the statute quoted above, the petitioner was charged 
with having required a miner to work eight full hours at 
the face of a drift in a mine in addition to the time neces-
sarily oc<;upied in traversing the shaft, underground drifts 
and tunnels, between the surface of the mine and the face 
of said drift. The time so occupied in going to and from 
the place of work was in excess of thirty ( 30) minutes. 
Petitioner applied for a writ of Habeas Corpus and the 
writ issued. 
The court in its opinion said: 
"We think the petitioner's contention that no vio-
lation of the act is here charged is correct and should 
be sustained. The act provides that the period of em-
ployment of persons employed or engaged in work in 
underground mines, etc., shall not exceed eight hours 
in any twenty-four hours. The purpose of the act is, 
as has been pointed out in the opinion in Cr. No. 1539, 
the protection of the health of men working in under-
ground mines. The injury to health which seems !() 
have been apprehended is that which would be encoun-
tered by one subject to the strain of performing manual 
labor under detrimental conditions. Giving to the 
words of the act their ordinary and reasonable mean-
ing, the limitation of time is to be construed as refer-
ring to the time when men are actually engaged in 
work, not when they are going to or from their work. 
There is nothing in the language of the act which would 
justify a more restricted interpretation." 
Nor can it be contended that plaintiffs' employees are 
working in underground mines. The term mine has a very 
specific meaning. 
A mine is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as: 
"A pit or excavation in the earth, from which ores 
or other mineral substances are taken by digging." 
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The same work defines mining as "The process or job 
of excavating from earth the precious or valuable metals 
either in their native state or in their ores." 
If the act of 1896 interpreted by this court in the Hol-
den cases, supra, applied only to underground mines, the act 
of 1937 adding the words "such eight hour period shall be 
computed from the time men go under ground until they 
return to the surface," cannot be interpreted as any evi-
dence of the legislative intention to extend the application 
of the act to any employees except those engaged in under-
ground mining. 
The only reasonable interpretation of the 1937 act is 
that it was a further exercise of the state's police power 
with respect to the industry being regulated. Suppose that 
the legislature, instead of the language used, had said: 
"The period of employment of working men in 
smelters and all other institutions for the reduction or 
refining of ores or metals, shall be eight hours per day, 
and the period of employment of working men in all 
underground mines or workings shall be not more than 
seven hours per day .... " 
Clearly, this language c~uld not be intended as an en-
largement upon the objects sought to be regulated. We 
submit that the language used in the statute is a further 
limitation upon the employment legitimately subject to reg-
ulation, and not an extension of the regulation to other em-
ployments. 
In interpreting the 1937 Act, the court will observe 
that it contains language appropriate only to underground 
mines. The Act provides: 
"When underground hoists or pumps are in con-
tinuous operation, hoistmen and pumpmen employed on 
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such hoists or pumps may be permitted to be under 
ground not to exceed eight hours and thirty minutes." 
The court will take judicial notice that the workings 
of plaintiffs afford no opportunity for hoists. Hoists are 
appropriate equipment in underground mines, not in a tun-
nel such as the one under consideration. The very use of 
that word would seem a potent argument that the Section 
applies only to underground mines or underground work-
ings connected with mines. 
ill. 
IF SECTION 49-3-2 REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH, 
1933, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 59, LAWS OF UTAH, 
1937, APPLIES TO A TUNNEL SUCH AS PLAINTIFFS 
ARE DRIVING, THE ACT VIOLATES SECTIONS 1, 3, 
7, AND 24 OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND THE 14th AMEND-
MENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
Our Constitution, Sec. 1, Article 1 declares: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right 
to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protests against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right." 
Sec. 3, Article 1 of our Constitution declares: 
" The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
federal Union, and the Constitution of the United States 
is the supreme law of the land." 
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Section 7, Article 1 of our Constitution declares: 
" No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." 
Sec. 24, Article 1 of our Constitution declares: 
" All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation.'' 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States declares: 
"Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive anyJ>er-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the law." 
The validity of Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, as a 
proper police regulation of plaintiffs' employees, does not 
follow from the decisions in the Holden cases, supra. If 
the purpose of the act is to extend the application of the 
eight hour law to underground tunnels not connected with 
mining, its validity is not established by the fact that the 
act which is amended was held valid. 
In 16 C. J. S. Section 195, Page 564, it is said: 
" .... A statutory provision which is not a legiti-
n1ate police regulation cannot be made such by being 
placed in the same act with a police regulation, nor by 
being enacted under a title that declares a purpose 
which would be a proper object for the exercise of the 
power. Also, the public purpose necessary to support 
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an exercise of the police power is not imparted into a 
legislative act merely because it supercedes an act 
which had such public purpose." 
We are not contending that a statute reasonably limit-
ing the period of employment of all employees within the 
state would necesarily be invalid. That question is not be-
fore the court. What we do contend, is that the inclusion 
of plaintiffs' employees in the section limiting the period of 
employment in underground mines is not evidence of the 
validity of the regulation as to plaintiffs, .any more than 
would be a provision that the period of employment of 
working men in all underground mines, in all mercantile 
institutions and on all farms shall be not more than eight 
hours per day. 
We are not unmindful of the difficulty of fixing the 
limits within which the police power may be exercised, but 
we do submit that it has limitations. 
The court has always reserved to itself the power of 
deciding whether a given statute is to be accepted as a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power of the state. In Mugler 
v. Kansas 123 U. S. 623, at Page 661, the Supreme Court 
of the United States said: 
"It does not at all follow that every statute en-
acted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends is to 
be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers 
of the state. There are, of necessity, limits beyond 
which legislation cannot rightfully go. While every 
possible presumption is to be indulged in favor of the 
validity of a statute .... the courts must obey the con-
stitution rather than the lawmaking department, and 
must upon their own responsibility, determine whether, 
in any particular case, these limits have been passed. 
'To what purpose' .... are powers limited, and to what 
purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these 
limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to 
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be restrained .... The courts are not bound by mere 
forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. 
They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn duty-
to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter 
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has tran-
scended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a stat-
ute purporting to have been enacted to protect the 
public health, the public morals, or the public safety, 
has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or 
is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the funda-
mental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge 
and thereby give effect to the constitution." 
The bounds of the police power are not clear cut, and 
the rules which limit its exercise under the constitution are 
not easy of application, but rules have been announced. 
This court, in the case of McGraw et al v. Industrial 
Commission, 96 Utah 203, observed: 
"This conception of the point at which the police 
power is held in check by the due process clause steers 
a course between the sophistry that rights are fixed 
or immutable, and not to be determined in relation to 
the public welfare, and the idea, rejected under our 
system, that the legislature itself is the sole judge of 
the extent of the police power." 
To admit that the legislature is the final judge of the 
extent to which it may go under the police power, is to 
break down every constitutional guarantee and to substi-
tute the legislature for the constitution and the judiciary. 
Standards by which the constitutionality of a statute 
enacted under the police power of a state is tested, require: 
1. That the means must have a substantial relation 
to the end. 
2. That fundamental rights must not be infringed. 
3. That the law in question must not be arbitrary, 
unreasonable, or oppressive. 
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It was said by Justice Holmes in Otis v. Parker, 187 
U.S. 606, at Page 608: 
"It is true, no doubt, that neither a state legisla-
ture nor a state constitution can interfere arbitrarily 
\vith private business or transactions, and the mere fact 
that an enactment purports to be for the protection 
of public safety, health or morals, is not conclusive up-
on the courts." 
In Eubank v. City of Richmond 226 U.S. 137 at Page 
143, it was said that the police power: 
"Has its limits and must stop when it encounters 
the prohibitions of the constitution." 
In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. City of Goldsboro, 
232 U. S. 548 at Page 559, the court said: 
" .... If .... there is wanton or arbitrary interfer-
ence with private rights, the question arises whether 
the lawmaking body has exceeded the legitimate bounds 
of the police power.'' 
In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 at Page 319, the 
court said: 
" .... The legislative power of a state can only be 
exerted in subordination to the fundamental principles 
of right and justice which the guarantee of due process 
in the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to preserve." 
In the ca,se of l\luller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, the 
court sustained an act of the Oregon legislature prohibiting 
the employment of women in any mechanical establishment, 
or factory or laundry more than ten hours during any one 
day. 
The court, in its opinion, observed that limitations upon 
hours of labor in the employment of women and children 
are quite general, and at Page 420 and 421 said: 
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"Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled 
by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is 
the peculiar value of a written constitution that it places 
in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action, 
and thus gives a permanence and stability to popular 
government which otherwise would be lacking. At the 
same time, when a question of fact is debated and de-
batable, and the extent to which a special constitu-
tional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect 
to that fact, a widespread and long continued belief con-
cerning it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial 
cognizance of all matters of general knowledge." 
Probably the ultimate test in determining whether a 
statute enacted under the police power violates the consti-
tutional guarantees, is the experience, the conscience, and 
the good sense of the judges. Precedent is seldom available 
in any given case, and the purposes of the legislature are 
in most cases matters of either presumption or conjecture. 
In the case of In re. l\:lorgan (Colo.) 58 Pac. 1071, 
the Colorado Court held that a statute making it unlawful 
to work more than eight hours per day in mines and smelt-
ers, was in violation of the state constitution guaranteeing 
liberty and the right to acquire, possess and protect prop-
erty. The Colorado Court considered the Holden cases, 
supra, and in its opinion said: 
"If, in our constitution there was, as there seems 
to be in that of Utah, a specific affirmative provision 
enjoining upon the general assembly the enactment of 
laws to protect the health of the classes of workmen 
therein enumerated, it might be that acts, reasonably 
appropriate to that end, would not be obnoxious to that 
provision of our constitution forbidding class regula-
tion, for it could hardly be said that a classification 
made by the constitution itself was arbitrary or unfair 
or that it clashed with another provision of the same 
instrument inhibiting class regulation." 
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But the present act, if it applies to plaintiffs' employees, 
does not come within the classification required by our con-
stitution to be given special protection. As heretofore 
pointed out, plaintiffs are not engaged in mining; and the 
only classifications mentioned in Section 6 of Article 16 are 
employees in factories, smelters and mines. 
If any presumptions arise from the language in Sec-
tion 6 of Article 16, it is that the legislature should provide 
for the health and safety of the employees in factories, 
smelters and mines and for no others. 
Certain it is, that as to other employments, there is 
no blanket authority given for their regulation such as the 
constitution provides for employees in factories, smelters 
and mines. As to other employments, the court should at 
least be satisfied that the legislature has deliberately con-
sidered the same; has considered the necessity of extending 
such police measures to them and determined upon a factual 
basis that regulation is necessary. 
We look in vain, to find any legislative declaration that 
employment in a tunnel such as plaintiffs are digging is 
injurious to the health and safety of workmen therein. The 
legislature has failed to indicate that in its judgment such 
occupation requires such regulation. 
The Supreme Court of this state found ample authority 
in Section 6, Article 16 of the constitution for reasonable 
regulation with respect to employees in factories, smelters 
and mines. At least this court, before subjecting plaintiffs 
to the penal statute in question, should require more than 
the bald limitation of hours as to plaintiffs' employees. 
Before proceeding further, let us observe that defend-
ants' answer admits all allegations of plaintiffs' petition, ex-
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cept their wrongful claim to jurisdiction for enforcement 
of the statute. 
Defendants admit that the tunnel has for its only pur-
pose the conveyance of water; that it is being worked from 
both portals; will be, when completed, 15,000 feet in length 
and 7 feet in diameter. That it is not a mine or connected 
with any mining enterprise; that there are no stopes, drifts 
or shafts, but that the tunnel is a straight bore and will be 
lined and reinforced with concrete and steel. 
Considering the facts in this case, the size of the tunnel, 
the fact that it is straight, that there are no drifts, no shafts, 
no stopes; that there are no holes in which foul air may 
accumulate or in which men must work, can the court say 
that there is any reasonable or valid basis in fact to war-
rant the extension to plaintiffs' workings of the regulation 
limiting the period of employment in underground mines? 
No public purpose, with respect to such industry, has 
been commanded in the constitution. The legislature has 
made no finding of that necessity, has never declared that 
such workings are dangerous or unhealthy. 
Do the facts known to the court fit the language of the 
Nevada Court in Ex parte Boyce, supra .... "We may 
consider the protection of the health and lives .of that large 
portion of the people in this state who delve in the earth 
in search of precious metals .... and who the,re, come in 
contact with poisonous minerals and breathe dust, foul air 
and obnoxious fumes and gases?" 
Do the facts before this court make the language of the 
Missouri Court in State v. Cantwell, supra, appropriate to 
this tunnel .... ? "The legislature doubtless realized the 
necessity of the provisions of this act being made applicable 
to those in search of minerals. The operations of mines 
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is a permanent business, lasting frequently for many years. 
On the other hand, the digging of a well or the running of a 
tunnel is not to be classed as a business, it is work that is 
completed in a comparatively short time & ••• '' 
Can this court fail to say that the conditions in plain-
tiffs' workings are so different from those in underground 
mines -the public necessity so lacking - that to apply 
the limitation on hours of labor justified in the latter to the 
former is arbitrary, unreasonable and void?' The court will 
take judicial notice that mining in this state constitutes a 
major industry. The court will likewise take judicial notice 
that the digging of a tunnel such as the one now under 
consideration is the exceptional, the unusual thing .. 
Unless the court entertains the view that the legisla-
tive declaration is conclusive evidence of the constitution-
ality of its action, it must construe this statute as having 
no application to plaintiffs. 
But there is a further reason why we believe this act 
can not be upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. 
Suppose the act in question limited the period of em .. 
ployment in all underground mines or workings to four 
hours in each twenty-four. Unless the court is willing to 
say that the law is constitutional because the legislature 
passed it, it could not be sustained. The court would un-
doubtedly see in such legislation a capricious, arbitrary 
and unreasonable limitation on the constitutional rights of 
plaintiffs. 
The act in question requiring that: 
"Such eight hour period shall be computed from 
the time men go under ground until they return to the 
surface," is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation 
to any legitimate end within the legislative power. 
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The legislature has not pretended to determine that 
the time used by workmen in going from the surface to 
their place of work, and returning to the surface, is detri-
mental to the health or safety of such employees or against 
the public welfare. 
This act does not, as its title would indicate, fix a stand-
ard day's work of eight hours or of seven hours. The 
period which constitutes a maximum day's labor is not de-
clared by the act, but must be determined by subtracting a 
variable period from eight hours. It does not declare the 
period of time that workmen in such a tunnel may work. 
It declares only, that they may labor not longer than the 
difference between eight hours and the time used in going 
into and coming out of said tunnel. The employee working 
at the entrance of this tunnel may work eight hours, while 
one employed at a point far distant from the entrance may 
be prohibited from working in excess of 4, 5, 6 or 7 hours, 
depending on the time consumed in traversing the course 
from the surface to his place of work and returning there-
from. 
The court will take judicial notice that the employees 
are not working while coursing this distance; that whether 
they walk or ride in on flat cars, they are not subjected to 
that fatigue and exhaustion which alone justifies such legis-
lation. 
This court, in the Holden Cases, supra, could not have 
had in mind the time consumed in coursing such a tunnel 
when it said: 
"The law in question is confined to the protection 
of that class of people engaged in labor in underground 
mines," and, "if men engaged in underground mining 
are liable to be injured in their health or otherwise, by 
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too many hours labor each day, a law to protect them 
should be aimed at that wrong." 
The constitution requires the legislature to pass laws 
to provide for the health and safety of employees in fac-
tories, smelters and mines. The 1937 act still permits work-
ing men in smelters and reduction and refining plants to 
work eight hours per day, but limits the time a man may 
work in underground mines or workings to a shorter pe-
riod. 
The constitution made no classification in favor of em-
ployees in underground mines. The legislature has by im-
plication created a classification favoring such employees. 
The act in question is arbitrary, capricious and unreason-
able, it arbitrarily furthers the interest of a particular class 
of employees. 
Unless this court would sustain a law which computed 
the eight hour period from the time such workmen left 
home until they returned to their homes, or from the time 
they reached the employer's premises until they left the 
premises, the court can not find legal justification for this 
act. 
In terms of its lowest denomination, this act is a shorter 
than eight hour law. It may be seven hours and fifty min-
utes per day, seven hours and thirty minutes per day, seven 
hours per day, six hours per day, five hours per day or 
four hours per day, depending on the variable period re-
quired or used in travelling underground and in returning 
to the surlace. 
Statutes limiting hours of labor in undertakings car-
ried on by the state are upheld not as an exercise of the 
police power, but as an assertion by the state of its right to 
regulate conditions upon which its work will be done. 
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Statutes regulating hours of labor of women have been 
sustained upon the ground of natural or assumed disabilities 
of the so-called weaker sex. 
Statutes regulating hours of labor in dangerous or un-
healthful industries have been sustained as a protection to 
health and safety of such laborers. 
But if the statute imposing such regulation has no real 
or substantial relation to the objects justifying it, or is 
a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental 
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge and thereby 
give effect to the constitution. State v. Packer Corpora-
tion, 77 Utah, 500, 510. 
The statute in question is denoted a labor law. It pur-
ports to declare what constitutes a day's work. Nothing 
outside the act is required to show the fallacy and the un-
reasonableness of the limitation contained in the act. This 
act fixes a period of less than eight hours as a day's work 
in underground mines and workings. No shorter than an 
eight hour day applies to smelters and factories. A day of 
less than eight hours has no reasonable relation to the 
health and safety of employees or to the public welfare. 
It is not inconceivable that this act may well constitute 
a complete prohibition of labor in certain underground mines 
or workings; it is certain that in every case it will consti-
tute a varying limitation upon the hours of labor ranging 
in periods from eight hours to a complete prohibition. 
The court must, in every case presented, hold the legis-
lative egg claimed to be sustained under the state's police 
power before the candle of the constitutional guarantees, 
and determine whether the legislative enactment constitutes 
a legitimate exercise of the police power, or is merely 
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meddlesome interference with business or the right to bar-
gain for services. 
The court must look beyond form to substance. The 
act in question is not a labor act-it is an exemption from 
the labor act. It is a legislative fiat that that which is not 
labor shall be called labor and paid for as labor. It is 
unreasonable and unwarranted interference with plaintiffs' 
right to secure eight hours of labor instead of securing only 
four or six or seven hours' labor, labelled by the legislative 
meddling, as eight hours. This act certainly singles out 
that class of employers operating underground mines or 
workings, and infringes their constitutional rights by ex-
tending special consideration to their employees not ex-
tended to any other class of employees within the state, and 
without any apparent or justifiable reason for so doing. 
It is a legislative attempt to reclassify the classification 
named in the constitution "employees in factories, smelters 
and mines," without apparent reason or justification and 
in a manner entirely arbitrary and capricious. 
It certainly singles out that class of employees who 
work in underground mines or workings for special consider-
ation and discriminates against employers of such labor. 
In Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah 495, 499; 151 Pac. 51, 
this court said: 
"If there be one thing more than others to be 
guarded against encroachment it is the federal and 
state Constitutions. These we are all sworn to pro-
tect and defend. To disobey them is to jeopardize fun-
damental rights and liberties of the people, imperil their 
welfare and happiness, and to menace the very ex-
istence of governments." 
In the case of State v. Henry, (N. Mex.) 25 Pac. 2nd 
204, 208, the court had for interpretation a statute prohibit-
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ing the working of male employees in mercantile establish-
ments more than eight hours a day, or 48 hours in a week 
of six days. The court reviewed the authorities and said: 
"The statute before us bears no evidence of a legis-
lative purpose by it to safeguard health, morals, or 
safety. No claims are here made that it was so in-
tended or will so result. Facts of which we may take 
judicial notice, and none other are before us, do not 
argue, and we are unable to concede, that the health, 
morals, or safety of the general public or of the class 
regulated are at all involved in the sustaining or the 
overthrow of the act; or that there is involved any 
other specific object for which we have become accus-
tomed to some yielding of the principles of personal 
liberty and of private property." 
In the case of Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, (S. C.) 2 S. E. 
2nd 36, decided March 1939, the statute prohibited the em-
ployment of employees of enumerated manufacturing and 
mercantile establishments for more than 56 hours per week 
or 12 hours per day. 
Plaintiffs, as employers affected by the limitation on 
hours of labor, brought injunction against the Commissioner 
of Labor to prevent the enforcement of the act. The court 
held: 
1. That the act deprived plaintiffs of their prop-
erty without due process of law, and denied them the 
equal protection of the law. 
In the course of its opinion, the court said: 
"Neither counsel for the plaintiffs nor the Com-
missioner of Labor have cited to the Court any de-
cision where any court has ever held valid a regulation 
of the hours of labor of all employees within a State, ... 
"Many other Courts have similarly held that the 
general regulation of the hours of labor in private in-
dustry in which the Court can see no direct relation 
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to the public health, welfare or morals, is not a proper 
exercise of the police power and must be held invalid 
as in violation of the constitutional protection of the 
individual .... 
"It is also worthy of note that there are no real 
recitations in this Act indicating that it was passed 
upon any theory that work for more than fifty-six hours 
in any week was injurious to the health or dangerous 
to the life of the employees. Nor is there anything in 
the Act indicating a purpose to relieve unemployment. 
Nor is there anything showing a purpose to protect the 
public from any evil results of longer hours of work. 
"The Court cannot conclude that it is dangerous 
to the health or safety of the employees or the public 
for an employee to work more than fifty-six hours in 
any one week in all of the manufacturing and mercan-
tile establishments covered by the terms of the Act .... 
"It is true that the Legislature has the power in 
passing a law to make a classification of its citizens 
and the constitutional provisions are not violated by 
such classification if the law as passed is applicable 
alike to all persons of the given class, but the Courts of 
the State and of the United States have always held 
that such classification cannot be made arbitrarily, but 
must rest upon some difference which bears a reason-
able and just relation to the Act in which the classifica-
tion was proposed .•.. 
" 'Equality in right, privilege, burdens and protec-
tion is the thought running through the Constitution 
and laws of the state; and an act intentionally and nec-
essarily creating inequality therein, based on no reason 
suggested by necessity or difference in condition or cir-
cumstances, is opposed to the spirit of free gover!lment, 
and expressly prohibited by the Constitution.' 
"'A law is not constitutional if it confers particu-
lar privileges, or imposes peculiar disabilities or burden-
some conditions in the exercise of a common right upon 
a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general 
body of those that stand in the same relation to the sub-
ject of the law. The Legislature may classify, for the 
purpose of legislation, if some intrinsic reason exists 
why the law should operate upon some and not upon all, 
or should affect some differently from others, but this 
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classification must be based upon differences which are 
either defined by the Constitution, or are natural or 
intrinsic, and which suggest a reason that may ration-
ally be held to justify the diversity in the legislation. It 
must not be arbitrary, for the mere purpose of classifi-
cation. The clause must be characterized by some sub-
stantial qualities or attributes, which render such legis-
lation necessary or appropriate for the individuals of 
the class.' 
"It is also true that the right of the Legislature to 
classify is much broader in the field of taxation than 
it is in criminal statutes such as this." 
The South Carolina Court found that the classifications 
upon which exemptions were based were arbitrary and with-
out reasonable basis, and observed: 
" .... There would seem to be no reason why a 
truck driver for a laundry should be exempt. while a 
truck driver for a dry cleaning plant should be regu-
lated. There would seem to be no reason why brick 
and tile works should be regulated and employees of 
saw mills, turpentine plants and logging industries 
should be exempt. Cotton gins and oil mills are not as 
healthful places of employment as book stores or fill-
ing stations, yet the gins and oil mills are exempt while 
the book stores and filling stations are regulated .... 
the court cannot say that the industries included ·within 
the provisions of the Act are of such a character as to 
justify the Legislature in saying that work in these in-
dustries for more than fifty-six hours per week jeop-
ardizes the health of the employee, while work for more 
than fifty-six hours in the exempted businesses does 
not." 
The North Carolina Court did not surrender its judg-
ment and its knowledge of facts or public opinion to the 
legislative branch. We submit that the classification in 
favor of employees in underground mines or workings is as 
arbitrary as those in the statute of North Carolina, and 
also reclassifies what the Constitution has already classified. 
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In Adair v. U.S., 208 U. S~ 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 280 the 
court said: 
"The right of a person to sell his labor upon such 
terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same 
as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the 
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from 
the person offering to sell .... In all such particulars~ 
the employer and the employee have equality of. right,. 
and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an 
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract 
which no government can legally justify in a free land" 
Does not the Act now before the Court db exactly what 
the Adair case, supra, said might not be done? 
In United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 
318 the Supreme Court used this language: 
"When an act of Congress is appropriately chal-
lenged in tfie courts as not conforming to the constitu-
tional mandate, the judicial branch of the government 
has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution 
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged 
and to decide whether the latter squares with the for-
mer. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its 
considered judgment upon the question. The only 
power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of 
judgment. This court neither approves nor condemns 
any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office 
is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is 
in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provi-
sions- of the Constitution; and, having done that, its 
duty ends." 
When the court lays the Constitution beside this stat-
ute, does the statute square with the constitution? Is the 
Act-computing as a part of the eight hour period time 
when the employee· is :not working~for the health- or safety 
of the employee? Is it for the peace, health, safety or wel-
fare of the state? Does it combat unemployment by in'-
creasing employment? 
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Is the limitation on the hours of labor of plaintiffs' em-
ployees incidental to the welfare of the state, or is said 
limitation the ultimate end? 
If the Court, by laying the Constitution beside the Stat-
ute, can see in said legislation only the extension of special 
privileges to employees in underground mines or workings, 
then the act must be held invalid. 
We respectfully submit that the Act in question has no 
application to plaintiffs' employees, and as applied to plain-
tiffs is unconstitutional and void. The writ should be made 
permanent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEO. W. WORTHEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
APPENDIX 
" EXHIBIT I " 
No. 6221 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROIDBITION 
Plaintiffs complain of defendants and respectfully pe-
tition this Honorable Court for a writ of prohibition and 
allege as follows, to-wit: 
I. 
That petitioners are co-partners doing business un-
der the firm name and style of Thompson-Markham Com-
pany and that petitioners have complied with the laws of 
the State of Utah with respect to obtaining a license as 
contractor and have obtained from the Department of Reg-
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istration of the State of Utah a license to engage in business 
in the State of Utah as contractors. 
IT. 
That heretofore plaintiffs entered into a contract in 
writing with the United States of America, Department of 
Interior, Bureau of Reclamation for the construction by 
plaintiffs of two certain tunnels known as Olmsted and 
Alpine-Draper Tunnels, Salt Lake Aqueduct, in connection 
with and as part of a project known as the Deer Creek 
Project, having for its purpose the conveyance and trans-
portation of water from the Deer Creek Reservoir on 
Provo River in Utah County, State of Utah, for use by 
subscribers of said water in Salt Lake· County, State of 
Utah. 
m. 
That plaintiffs are now engaged in the execution of 
said contract and particularly engaged in the construction 
of that part of said project known as the Alpine-Draper 
Tunnel; and that under the said contract and the plans 
and specifications therefor, said tunnel runs from a point 
in the vicinity of Alpine, Utah County, State of Utah, to 
a point in the vicinity of Draper, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and projects through the elevation separating said 
two above-named points, and said tunnel proceeds and will 
be constructed when completed at a grade of four feet per 
mile and will have when completed a length of approxi-
mately 15,000 feet; that said tunnel so being constructed 
is approximately seven feet in diameter and is being sup-
ported and will be supported when completed with steel ribs 
from two feet to six feet apart, and is to be lined and re-
inforced with concrete. 
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IV. 
That said work is being prosecuted with two separate 
crews of laborers or workmen, one operating from the 
Alpine portal and one operating from the Draper portal, 
the present total number of workmen engaged being in 
excess of seventy individuals, approximately forty-eight of 
said workmen working inside the tunnel, and which said 
workmen and laborers consist in the main of drillers, ma-
chine men, timber men, carpenters, cement men, mucking 
machine tenders, common laborers and foremen. 
v. 
The minimum wages to be paid by plaintiffs to said 
employees are fixed by the terms and provisions of said 
contract, with which wage scale plaintiffs are complying, 
and said contract requires that plaintiffs shall fully com-
plete said work within 650 calendar days from the date of 
receipt of notice to said contractors to commence work, 
said notice having been given to plaintiffs December 30, 
1938; and that by the terms and provisions of said agree-
ment heavy penalties by way of liquidated damages and 
provisions for forfeiture and termination of said agreement 
are provided to be imposed against plaintiffs in the event 
of failure to prosecute said work according to schedule and 
for failure to complete the same within the time specified. 
VI. 
That said defendant The Industrial Commission of 
Utah is a commission of the State of Utah, designated by 
statute, and that said defendant William M. Knerr is the 
chairman of said commission and that said defendants Wil-
liam M. Knerr, 0. F. McShane, and Frank A. Jugler are the 
members thereof; that the defendant E. A. Hodges is the 
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duly appointed and acting State Metal Mine Inspector and 
an employee of defendant The Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 
VII. 
That in the prosecution of said project there is no shaft 
constructed or to be constructed in connection therewith, 
and that it is not the purpose of plaintiffs or of the United 
States of America, Department of the Interior, Bureau of 
Reclamation, or of the employees of plaintiffs to explore for 
or discover mineral values or to develop or operate a mine 
or smelter in connection with said project, but only to drive 
a straight tunnel to be used only for the water as herein 
alleged. 
VIII. 
That in the prosecution of the work to be performed 
under said contract, said tunnel is equipped with electric 
lights and the workmen and laborers therein are provided 
with fresh air by means of mechanical devices provided by 
plaintiffs. That there are no stopes, drifts, depressions or 
elevation where impure air can accumulate, and that 
through said mechanical devices all gas, smoke and impure 
air are drawn by suction pumps to the outside and pure 
air is blown to the headings within said tunnel and dis-
tributed throughout the same, and that said defendants 
have not at any time or at all by general or special order 
found that said place of employment is unsafe or injurious 
to the welfare of said employees, nor has any complaint 
been made by any person to said defendants that said place 
of employment is unsafe or injurious to the welfare of said 
or any employee or employees of said plaintiffs. 
IX. 
That said defendants, and each of them, wrongfully· 
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and unlawfully claim and contend that they have jurisdic-
tion over the operations of plaintiffs under the terms 
and provisions of said contract by virtue of the provisions 
of Section 49-3-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as 
amended by Chapter 59 of the Laws of Utah, 1937, with 
reference to the hours of labor as constituting a days' work 
as applied to the prosecution of said project. 
X. 
That heretofore said defendants have notified plain-
tiffs that it is unlawful for plaintiffs to require or permit 
their said workmen to work eight hours per day at the 
place of employment within said tunnel, and that the pe-
riod of employment of all of the said employees shall be 
not more than eight hours per day, computed from the 
time when said employees enter the portal of said tunnel 
until they return to the entrance thereof, and that it is un-
lawful for plaintiffs to require or permit their said em-
ployees to work more than eight hours each day from the 
time when said employees enter the portal of said tunnel 
until they return to the entrance thereof. 
XI. 
That in the prosecution of said work plaintiffs have re-
quired their said employees to work eight hours per day 
at their place of employment within said tunnel, and to 
change shifts at the place of employment within said tunnel 
and not at the portal of said tunnel, and that in computing 
the said eight-hour period per day the time consumed to 
going from the portal to the place of employment and re-
turning therefrom to the portal of said tunnel is not com-
puted, all of which is in conformity with the agreement of 
said plaintiffs with their said employees. 
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XII. 
That said defendants have notified plaintiffs that un-
less plaintiffs shall cease and desist from requiring or per-
mitting their said employees to work eight hours per day 
at the place of employment within said tunnel, and unless 
plaintiffs shall require their said employees to work not to 
exceed eight hours per day from the time they enter the 
portal of said tunnel until they return to the entrance there-
of, the defendants will institute criminal proceedings against 
plaintiffs alleging violation by plaintiffs of Section 49-3-2, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended by Chapter 59, 
Laws of Utah, 1937, by requiring plaintiffs' employees to 
work more than eight hours per day from the time said 
employees enter the portal of said tunnel until they return 
to the entrance thereof; that defendants have notified 
plaintiffs that such criminal proceedings will be instituted 
and prosecuted covering each of plaintiffs' employees for 
each day that any of said employees are permitted or re-
quired to work more than eight hours from the time said 
employees enter said tunnel until they return to the en-
trance thereof. 
That defendants wrongfully and unlawfully claim and 
assert that they have jurisdiction to administer and enforce 
the provisions of Section 49-3-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, as amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, 
against the plaintiffs, and defendants wrongfully and un-
lawfully claim and assert that they have jurisdiction by and 
through the use of such criminal proceedings to compel 
plaintiffs to comply with the provisions of said Section 49-
3-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended by Chap-
ter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, by permitting and requiring 
their said employees to work not more than eight hours 
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from the time said employees enter said tunnel until they 
return to the entrance thereof. That the terms and pro-
visions of said section of the statute as amended as afore-
said has no applicability to plaintiffs and/ or their employ-
ees, and that said defendants are without jurisdiction to 
enforce or administer the terms or provisions thereof as 
against plaintiffs and/ or their employees, and defendants 
are without jurisdiction to regulate in any manner the 
hours of labor on the project hereinbefore described, or to 
require plaintiffs to demand that their employees work not 
more than eight hours from the time they enter said tunnel 
until they return to the entrance thereof. 
That in the event said defendants shall carry out their 
said threats and institute said numerous and vexatious 
suits and proceedings, said plaintiffs will be caused great 
expense and annoyance and greatly hampered and impaired 
in the prosecution of their said project, with the possibility 
of delay, damage and forfeiture under the terms and pro-
visions thereof. 
XIII. 
That by reason of the multiplicity of suits threatened 
to be and which will be instituted against plaintiffs by said 
defendants in the event they be not prohibited and re-
straine.d by this Court, and by reason of the period of time 
consumed and which will be consumed in the hearing of 
said numerous actions and the appeals therefrom to the 
district courts and to this Court, that a remedy by appeal 
from said actions will be .and is inadequate as a remedy for 
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that an alternative writ 
of prohibition issue from this Court requiring said defend-
ants, and each of them, immediately to desist and refrain 
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from instituting any proceedings, criminal or otherwise, 
against plaintiffs, or either of them, by reason of the hours 
of employment required or permitted to be served or en-
gaged in by the employees of plaintiffs upon said project, 
and to immediately cease and desist asserting, claiming, or 
assuming any jurisdiction whatsoever over plaintiffs and/or 
their said employees upon said project in the prosecution 
of said work with respect to the hours of labor permitted 
or required by plaintiffs from their said employees in con-
nection with said project under the terms and provisions of 
said statute, to which reference is herein made; and that 
said defendants, and each of them, be required to show 
cause before this Honorable Court why said alternative 
writ should not be made permanent; and that said defend-
ants, and each of them, be required to show cause at a 
time to be fixed by this Court why they should not be per-
manently prohibited from proceeding in any way, by crimi-
nal proceedings or otherwise, from enforcing the terms and 
provisions of said Section 49-3-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, as amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, as 
against plaintiffs and their said employees in the prosecu-
tion of their contract with the United States of America 
for the construction of said tunnel, Department of the In-
terior, Bureau of Reclamation, for the construction of said 
tunnel; and plaintiffs pray further for such other relief as 
may seem proper, and for their costs herein incurred. 
GEO. W. WORTHEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
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STATE OF UTAH, } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH. 
GEORGE K. THOMPSON, being first duly sworn on 
oath, deposes and says: 
That he is one of the plaintiffs in the above entitled 
action; that he has read the above and foregoing Petition 
for Writ of Prohibition; that he knows and understands the 
contents thereof and that the statements therein contained 
are true to his best knowledge, information and belief. 
GEORGE K. THOMPSON 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of 
January, A. D. 1940. 
(Seal) 
GEO. W. WORTHEN, 
Notary Public 
Residing at Provo, Utah. 
My commission expires Dec. 8, 1941. 
" EXHIBIT 2 " 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
ANSWER 
COME NOW the above named defendants and in an-
swer to the Petition for Writ of Prohibition filed herein 
admit, deny and allege as follows: 
I. 
These defendants admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 1 of said Petition. 
II. 
These defendants admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 2 of said Petition. 
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m. 
These defendants admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 3 of said Petition. 
IV. 
These defendants admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 4 of said Petition. 
v. 
In answer to Paragraph 5 of said Petition these 
defendants admit the allegations therein contained, but al-
lege that said allegations are not material to the issues 
involved in this case. 
VI. 
These defendants admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 6 of said Petition. 
VII. 
These defendants admit the allegations contained in 
Paragraph 7 of said Petition. 
VITI. 
In answer to Paragraph 8 of said Petition, these 
defendants admit that the tunnel therein mentioned is 
equipped with electric lights and that fresh air is forced 
into the tunnel by means of mechanical devices and admits 
there are no stopes, drifts or shafts in said tunnel, but de-
nies that by reason of said mechanical devices all gas, smoke 
and impure air are drawn out of said tunnel. These de-
fendants admit that they have made no general or special 
order to the effect that the employment of men is unsafe 
or injurious to the welfare of said employees. These de-
fendants admit that no complaint has been made to these 
defendants that the place of employment is unsafe or in-
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jurious to the welfare of the employees working therein. 
That in further answer to said Paragraph 8, these defend· 
ants allege that the said tunnel is equipped with modern 
equipment for the purpose of removing the gas, smoke and 
impure air from said tunnel, but deny that by reason there-
of all of such gas, smoke and impure air is removed, al-
though every effort is being made by the plaintiffs to keep 
the said tunnel as clear of impure air as can reasonably be 
done. 
IX. 
In answer to Paragraph 9 of said Petition these 
defendants admit that they claim to have jurisdiction over 
the operations of plaintiffs by virtue of the section of the 
law therein referred to, but deny that they wrongfully make 
such claim. In further answer to said Paragraph 9 these 
defendants allege that it is their duty under the law of this 
State to supervise every employment and place of employ-
ment and to enforce the laws for the protection of the life, 
health, safety and welfare of all employees, and to insti-
tute such civil actions as may be necessary to accomplish 
such purposes and to request the prosecution of criminal 
actions to enforce such purposes. 
X. 
In answer to Paragraph 10 of said Petition these 
defendants admit the allegations therein contained. 
XI. 
In answer to Paragraph 11, these defendants ad-
mit that plaintiffs have required their employees to work 
eight hours per day at the place of employment in said 
tunnel and to change shifts at the place of employment 
within said tunnel and not at the portal thereof, and that 
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in computing the said eight hour period per day, the time 
consumed in going from the portal to the place of employ-
ment and returning therefrom to the portal is not com-
puted. These defendants, however, have no information 
relating to the agreements between plaintiffs and their em-
ployees with respect to such matters. 
XII. 
In answer to Paragraph 12 of said Petition these 
defendants admit that they have notified plaintiffs that un-
less they cease and desist from requiring said employees 
to work more than eight hours per day, the said hours to 
be computed from the time that they go underground until 
they return to the surface, that they will request that crimi-
nal proceedings be taken against plaintiffs, by swearing to 
complaints, in accordance with the laws of this State re-
lating to such matters, and that such criminal proceedings 
will be instituted whenever plaintiffs violate the laws of 
this State, relating to such employment, by requesting crimi-
nal complaints, or by otherwise commencing civil actions. 
These defendants admit that they claim and assert that 
they have jurisdiction to administer and enforce the pro-
visions of the law referred to in said Paragraph 11, and 
other provisions of law relating to the employment of labor, 
and that under the laws of this State relating to the em-
ployment of labor in all underground workings, it is the 
duty of these defendants to see that such laws are complied 
with, but deny that they make such claims and assertions 
unlawfully and without authority, and deny that the sec-· 
tions of law referred to in said paragraph did not apply to 
plaintiffs, but on the contrary, allege that the mining oper-
ations carried on by plaintiffs comes within the provisions 
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of the law of this State relating to underground mining 
operations. 
XIII. 
In answer to Paragraph 13 of said Petition these 
defendants admit that there would be a multiplicity of suits, 
unless prohibited by this Court, started against plaintiffs, 
unless they refrain from working their said employees more 
than eight hours underground. Further answering said 
Petition and as a further defense thereto, these defendants 
allege that the tunnel now being driven by plaintiffs is an 
underground workings built and constructed for the pur-
pose of conveying water. That the methods used in con-
structing said tunnel are very similar to those used by min-
ing companies in the construction of tunnels and other 
underground workings. That the rocks are broken by the 
use of powder, and the muck is removed by the use of men 
or machinery. That fresh air is forced into the tunnel by 
use of "blowers," and the bad air is drawn from the tunnel 
by reversing the "blowers." That like all tunnels in this 
mountainous country, water is encountered in the tunnel 
driven by the plaintiffs, and that the air in the said tunnel, 
like all other underground workings within this mountain-
ous country, is cold and damp, containing at times powder 
smoke and other gases which cannot be entirely removed 
from the tunnel even by the use of the most modern meth-
ods now in use, and in this connection, these defendants 
allege that the tunnel being driven by plaintiffs is equipped 
with the most modern of such methods, in the same way 
that tunnels being driven in this State for mining purposes 
are equipped. 
WHEREFORE, THESE DEFENDANTS PRAY that 
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the temporary Writ issued herein be dissolved, and that the 
Court refuse to make the Writ permanent, and that these 
defendants be awarded their costs. 
JOSEPH CHEZ, 
Attorney General of Utah 
By S. D. HUFFAKER, 
Assistant Attorney General 
STATE OF UTAH, } 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH, 
0. F. McShane, being duly sworn, deposes and says 
that he is one of the defendants above named; that he 
makes this verification on behalf of himself and the 
other defendants; that he has read the above Answer 
and knows the contents thereof, and that the same are 
true of his own knowledge, except as to matters al-
leged on information and belief, and as to such matters 
he believes them to be true. 
(SIGNED) 0. F. McSHANE 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day 
of February, 1940. 
C. I. SMITH, 
My commision expires: 
Notary Public residing at 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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